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A Note on Venture Capital Networks: 
Promise and Performance
Donald J. Brown 
Charles R. B. Stowe
Since 1984 Informal Venture Networks (VCNs) have been formed and are 
currently operating in several states and Canada. However, little has been written 
in regard to the performance of these networks. This article presents the results 
of preliminary research concerning their performance. Our research reveals 
several factors that are presently limiting the VCNs’ success and will continue 
to do so until diey are changed. The limited success of the VCNs to date is 
primarily the result of a lack of funding. Because of small operating budgets, 
most VCNs have only minimal amounts available for marketing and promotion. 
Until the VCNs are adequately funded, their high promise will not be matched 
by performance.
When the first inform al venture capital network was formed, at the 
University of New Ham pshire’s Whittemore School of Business and 
Economics in 1984, expectations rose that these networks could hold high  
promise as a vehicle through which small businesses in need of risk capital 
m ight acquire financing. Based on the original model developed at New  
Hampshire by Dr. W illiam  Wetzel and with his assistance, fourteen 
additional venture capital networks have been established at various 
locations in the United States and Canada over the past five years. These 
networks are essentially a conduit through which information can flow, and 
contacts can be established between potential investors and entrepreneurs. 
The networks role is sim ply to bring the two groups together. This is 
accomplished by listing inform ation taken from each group in a computer 
data base and then seeking to “match” those with similar interest profiles. 
This type of service has been described as a “computer dating service for 
investors and entrepreneurs” [17]. Once the two have been brought together, 
the network’s involvem ent ceases. They cannot be involved beyond the point 
of initial contact since they lack the authority to act as broker-dealers or as 
investment advisers. Their contribution to the efficiency of the informal 
venture capital market is that of collecting, aggregating and distributing
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inform ation which is useful to investors and entrepreneurs for each ones 
decision-making process.
T he objective of this paper is to review and assess, where possible, the 
development of this segment of the inform al venture capital market. We 
realize that most of the networks are under three years old  and that limited  
resources have been committed to them in most cases but we believe much 
can be learned by exam ining their success and or lack thereof to date.
Some of the relevant questions w hich can be answered relate to the costs 
of operating a network, how each is funded, how  they are marketed, what 
the people involved see as important issues to be addressed and how  these 
networks can be improved. We realize that more time is needed before a 
complete assessment can be done but we believe a preliminary assessment 
has value at the present.
REVIEW OF T H E  LITERATURE
The best account of the founding of the Venture Capital Network concept 
is written by its creator, Professor W illiam  E. Wetzel of the University of 
New Hampshire. W riting in 1983, Professor Wetzel explored the dilemma 
facing many entrepreneurs during the early 1980s, namely, that venture 
capital companies normally invest in  projects that “require $500,000 or more 
of financing, that yield projected revenues of more than $20 m illion  within 
five to ten years and that can go public or sell out by that tim e” [23]. Citing 
a 1980-1981 study by Professors T im m ons and Gumpert that surveyed fifty 
one of the largest and most active professional venture capital firms, Wetzel 
noted that the study revealed that the size of a typical individual investment 
by a venture capital firm was $813,000. But research by Gaston indicates the 
average size investment in the informal equity capital market is only $66,700 
[16]. The problem for the relatively new company is to grow large enough 
to attract venture capital financing and with lim ited resources of fam ily and 
friends, the entrepreneur must turn to “angels”—those w illin g  to purchase 
“founders’ stock” in the enterprise. Under a grant from the Sm all Business 
Administration, Wetzel and his colleagues turned up 133 investors w ho fit 
die self-imposed description of a business angel. T he objective of this research 
was to find out “where angels come from, how  many there are, how  to find 
them or what angles look for in a venture proposal” [23]. One of the questions 
Wetzel asked the angels was whether they were satisfied w ith the effectiveness 
of existing channels of com m unication between bona fide entrepreneurs and 
investors like them selves. U sin g  a Likert scale, totally dissatisfied  
respondents outnumbered “definitely satisfied” respondents by more than 
four to one [23] confirm ing other studies reflecting general dissatisfaction
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w ith the market efficiency/flow  of inform ation by participants in  the 
venture capital industry [4]. Armed w ith the results of the SBA study, Wetzel 
persuaded the University of New Hampshire and the Business and Industry 
Association of New Ham pshire to create VCN as a joint project w hich in  
turn w ould contract V C N ’s managem ent to the Office of Small Business 
Programs of U N H  [19].
T he significance of the role of “angels” can only be brought into focus 
by exam ining the research on the function of the entire venture capital 
industry on the economy. Venture capital has been described as serving the 
function of accelerating the process of technological change and that venture 
capitalists perform a gate-keeping function [14]. The researchers conclude 
that “venture capital-financed innovation overcomes a variety of barriers 
w hich stymie technological progress including: the risk aversion of 
established fin a n c ia l m arkets, the organ ization al inertia o f large 
corporations, and the m ultifaceted technological, organizational and 
financial requirements of new business development” [14]. Interestingly, 
w hile the researchers charted the roles of venture capital in terms of three 
phases—catalyst-organizational to assistance to liquidation—they did not 
describe “angels” or identify the role of those w illing to invest relatively small 
amounts of capital in seed or start up entities. T o the extent that “angels” 
make possible entities large enough to attract the investment interest of the 
professional venture capital industry, the existence of such angels may yet 
form another “gatekeeper.”
W hile the emphasis of this study is to assess the impact of Venture 
Capital Networks in  their respective locations, it is important to note the 
research on the venture capital industry as a whole. In the United States, 
there are seven venture capital complexes: California (San Francisco/Silicon  
Valley), Massachusetts (Boston), New York, Illinois (Chicago), Texas, 
Connecticut, and Minnesota. Researchers have suggested that although  
venture capital is not absolutely necessary to facilitate high technology 
entrepreneurship, “w ell developed venture capital networks provide 
tremendous incentives for entrepreneurship by lowering the difficulties of 
entering an industry” [15]. If the existence of the professional venture capital 
industry is, as the researchers suggest, a self-feeding magnet that tends to 
attract more capital and more professional venture capitalists because 
professionals seek syndications or a sharing of risk, or as one researcher 
suggests the sharing of inform ation [9]; and if the existence of such centers 
of venture capital help to promote new business formation, then the question  
of the econom ic im pact of the Venture Capital Network is all the more 
intriguing for com m unities that are considering practical means of fostering 
new business development.
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Wetzel suggests through his 1987 study of risk capital that private 
investors manage a portfolio of venture investments aggregating in  the 
neighborhood of $50 b illion  which in 1987 was about twice the capital 
managed by professional venture investors! [25] Furthermore, Wetzel builds 
a case that by participating in smaller transactions, private investors finance 
over five times as many entrepreneurs as professional venture investors: 
20,000 or more firms per year compared to two or three thousand. Wetzel 
uses two methods to reach these conclusions about the size and nature of 
the “informal venture capitalists.” One is sim ply using data on wealth, 
income and asset distribution of U.S. households, and concluding that the 
top one percent of U.S. households have invested over $151 b illion  in  non­
public businesses in which they have no m anagem ent interest. “It is not 
unreasonable to believe that venture-type financing in  the portfolios of the 
top one percent may be at least $50 b illion ” [25]. C iting research conducted 
by Applied Economics Group, Inc. (AEG), Wetzel notes that the typical firm 
in AEG’s sample raised $220,500 of equity and near-equity financing, 
typically from three informal investors [25]. U sing this data, Wetzel 
concludes, “According to AEG’s data, informal investors com m it some 10- 
24% of their net worth to venture investments. If there are 345,000 informal 
venture investors in the U.S. w ith an average net worth of $750,000, and with 
10-24% of their net worth available for venture investments, the aggregate 
informal venture capital pool is between $25 b illion  and $62 b illion ” [25].
Other research recently completed by Gaston indicates that the 
contribution from the informal side of this market may be much larger than 
even Wetzel’s estimate [16]. U sing national survey data from the Informal 
Investor Microdata File, he estimated that 720,000 investors make some 
489,600 investments per year valuing an estimated annual flow  of $32.7 
billion [16]. T his is almost eight times the annual investment from the formal 
venture capital mzirket. Informal investment is the single largest source of 
small firm equity capital available and is approximately equal to the amount 
raised from all other sources combined [16]. Gaston concludes that die total 
investment from the informal group may exceed $167 b illion  based on a 5.1 
year mean holding period [16].
In spite of the size of the informal venture capital market, Wetzel’s review 
of studies shows that the most com m on and reliable sources of investment 
information among the “inform al” or non-professional venture investors 
were friends and business associates [24]. Most significantly, Wetzel cites 
many studies that document the inefficiency of the inform al capital market 
leading to what is described as “a discouragement effect operating among 
unsuccessful seekers of venture capital, would-be seekers of venture capital, 
and would-be entrepreneurs” [3, cited in  25]. A study published in 1988, 
provides additional research describing the “informal capital risk investors—
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angels” and confirms that their most com m on entry into an investment is 
through associates or friends. T he researchers confined their study to the East 
Coast and explored not only the issue of “market efficiency” but also the 
issues of investment criteria and the decision-making process utilized, and 
the results achieved by surveying a sample population consisting of members 
of New York venture capital clubs, graduates of specific professional schools 
(NYU and Wharton MBA graduates and medical), personal referrals and NY  
M etropolitan dentists. From a sample of 2989 potential respondents, 320 
responded affirmatively to their study. T he researchers developed a 
demographic profile reflecting the biases of their sample, but more 
intriguing was their analysis of the decision m aking strategies used by the 
respondents in evaluating an investment [18].
During the period July 1984 through June 1986, VCN arranged in excess 
of 1,000 introductions for over 200 entrepreneurs from 30 states and over 300 
investors from over 33 states [25].
T he establishment of the Venture Capital Network in New Hampshire 
was not unnoticed by both trade and academic publications. One writer noted 
that “taking the randomness out of matching angels with entrepreneurs 
would mean a wide range of opportunities for investors, w hile providing 
a badly needed pipeline to growth capital for small com panies” [5]. Business 
Week [8], D ir B Reports [5], In Business [17], and the Boston Herald [19] 
have all carried articles about the development of the Venture Capital 
Network and its spread throughout the country.
The concept of a database designed to match companies seeking capital 
with prospective investors was implemented on January 1, 1987 in Canada 
and by January 1988 the network had received over 7,000 requests for 
registration material from interested investors and corporations. The system 
called Computerized Investment Network (COIN) went national follow ing  
an initiative by Ontario premier David Peterson who “described COIN as 
an excellent opportunity for provinces to help one another” [12].
A review of the literature on informal venture networks reveals several 
key studies on the difficulties of identifying and measuring the informal 
venture capital investor called Angels [23, 24, 25, 20, 18]. The research cites 
the problems of market efficiency due to a lack of formal informational 
networking am ong needy companies and ready investors. The historical 
development of the Venture Capital Network and how it operates is fully 
described [22, 23, 24, 25, 6]. However, there has been little assessment as to 
the impact of all the VCNs, nor an assessment of the costs and benefits of 
such programs (which receive public funding for their support), nor an 
analysis of what factors account for higher participation or matches.
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PURPO SE AND M ETHODOLOG Y
The purpose of this inform al/prelim inary study is to assess the Venture 
Capital Network concept using the very sim ple criteria of number of 
participants, the number of matches, the number of fundings, and a 
subjective assessment of indirect benefits of the program.
T o obtain the data needed, questionnaires were m ailed and telephone 
calls were placed to fifteen directors of Venture Capital Networks during the 
first week of September 1989. T he questionnaire was designed to obtain the 
follow ing data: number of months of operation, number of investors per year, 
number of companies on the system, number of recorded matches, number 
of reported fundings, cost of operating and m aintaining the system, fees 
charged to both companies and investors, types of companies listed in the 
system, and the profile of investors. In addition, the directors were solicited 
to respond to a more detailed survey w hich w ill form the basis of a more 
sophisticated analysis of the Venture Capital Network concept w ith the hope 
of determining what expectations the system can reasonably fu lfill and what 
variants tend to influence the impact of the network.
PRESENTATION OF TH E RESULTS
The response to the questionnaire was very good. We received ten usable 
questionnaires out of a total of fifteen which were mailed out. The analysis 
of this group provides a useful understanding of this segment of a very 
important section of the financial markets. In addition to the usable question­
naires, we also received responses from three other VCNs indicating that they 
did not wish to participate in our research. Only two of the fifteen failed to 
respond in some manner. Dr. W illiam Wetzels’ office sent out an information 
memo on our behalf which certainly contributed to our resp>onse rate.
As this is a descriptive study, we present the questions asked and the 
results received in answer to each question. These questions and the 
aggregate response to each one is presented in  Tables 1-10 and is referred 
to in the follow ing discussion.
Table 1
Year of Organization of the VCN
Number organized in: 1986 1987 1988 1989
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Table 2 
Number of Employees
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VCNs with: Full-time employees Part-time employees Volunteers
3 10 2
Table 3
Number of Active Investors on All Networks
Number of VCNs with: 0-10 10-20 20-30 Greater than 30
2 2 3 3
Table I shows that this part of the informal Venture Capital Market 
is very young. Only one of the networks reporting to date is more than three 
years old, and from other sources of information we know that no more than 
three out of the total of fifteen are more than three years old.
Table 2 shows that only three of the reporting networks em ploy anyone 
on a full-tim e basis. All the networks showed part-time employees or 
volunteers w ith the most time available.
Table 3 indicates the number of investors who are currently registered 
as active investors on the reporting networks. The procedure is generally to 
keep the investor on the active list for only six months to one year per each 
registration. If they do not indicate that they wish to continue as an active 
investor they w ill then become classified as inactive and w ill no longer receive 
data on firms seeking capital. Some may become active at a future date after 
being inactive or they may choose to remedn inactive. The number of active 
investors ranged from a low  of three, on a very new network, to as many 
as 163 on one a little older. T he total number of active investors on those 
reporting networks is 417.
T he budgets of the Venture Capital Networks are relatively small. Table 
4 shows that only five have operating budgets greater than $10,000 annually. 
The smallest budget for annual operations of a network was estimated at 
$2,000 and the largest is $500,000.
Table 4 
Annual Operating Budget
$10,000 or less $10,000-$25,000 Greater than $25,000
5 3 2
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Table 5
Number of Firms Seeking Capital
VCNs with: 0-24 firms 25-50 firms Greater than 50 firms
2 3 5
Table 6
Number of Initial Matches Identified
VCNs with: 0-99 100-150 Greater than 150
5 2 3
The total number of entrepreneurs w ho are currently actively seeking 
capital through one of the Venture Capital Networks is 730. T he most on 
any one center is 223 and the fewest is three. Table 5 reveals two centers have 
fewer than 25 entrepreneurs; three have between 25 and 50^  and five have 
more than 50. These numbers, as well as the number of investors shown in 
Table 3, may reflect the importance of the size of the annual budget. An 
examination of the data shows that the center w ith the largest number of 
investors (163) and the largest number of entrepreneiirs (223) also has the 
largest annual budget ($500,000), and has only been in operation since late
1987. Also, the center which has the second highest numbers in  these two 
areas has the second largest budget and has only been operational since late
1988. More dollars may not mean more success, but from the lim ited data 
available it would appear that if these centers are goin g  to reach their 
potential users they w ill need more funding.
Tables 6 and 7 show that some lim ited am ount of capital has been raised 
through the centers in 1989. As the tables show, several successful matches 
were reported. These involved a total of more than $3,000,000. When one 
considers the lim ited budgets of the centers it appears that they are cost 
effective. However, if operating budgets remain small, they are not likely 
to reach a large enough group of entrepreneurs and investors in order to 
have a significant impact on their region’s or state’s econom ic growth rate.
Table 7
Amount of Investment Resulting From Matches
Dollar amount: Unknown $0-$100,000 Over $100,000
Table 8 
Marketing Plans of VCNs
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Yes No
Do you have a formal marketing plant? 7 3
Is your plan a written plan? 0 10
More time and much more data are needed before this type of determination 
can be made. Also, in  addition to the funding acquired through the centers, 
some firms are acquiring funding from other sources because of their effort 
to get funding through the centers. The center directors interviewed were 
aware of several such occurrences. Because of the expertise the entrepreneur 
gained through their association with the center, they were successful in  
obtaining other funding. Also, there were reports of other fundings which  
occurred as a result of an entrepreneur’s involvement with a center. In some 
cases, the result of the com pany’s involvem ent with a center took the form 
of debt funding from a bank. In these instances, the banks were w illin g  to 
lend the firm additional funds because of the equity investment made by the 
Angel or because the Angel agreed to help secure the debt. T his type of 
funding is much more difficult to track but it is apparent from these past 
experiences that direct equity funding from Angels is only one benefit which  
can result from entrepreneurs involvem ent with a Venture Capital Network. 
Gaston’s analysis of the Microdata file provides an estimate that in  addition 
to a $32.7 b illion  annual equity flow, $22.0 billion is extended to small firms 
in the form of loans and loan guarantees from the informal investors [16].
Tables 8 ,9  and 10 reveal a great deal about the importance of marketing 
on venture capital activity through venture capital networks. Since these 
VCNs are new organizations without prior history or track records, they need 
wide exposure in  order to generate interest both from investors and
Table 9 
Advertising Methods of VCNs
Method used VCNs
Newsletters 4
Brochures 10
Seminars 3
Business publications and/or business newspapers 5
Word-of-mouth 10
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Table 10 
Sources of Funding
Percentage Supplied by Each Source: 0-25% 25%-50% >50%
Federal Government 1 1
State Government 5
University 1
Company fees 3 2 2
Investor fees 2 2 1
Private Donation 2
Private Grants 1
entrepreneurs. Like any new product or service, VCNs need a well-organized, 
aggressive marketing program if they are going  to fu lfill their promise. As 
Tables 3 and 5 show, VCNs are enjoying lim ited success in  attracting 
investors and entrepreneurs. Our analysis suggests a direct correlation 
between funding and participation. Table 4 reveals that only one or two of 
the VCNs have sufficient funding to allow  any am ount of marketing beyond 
the m inim al effort of producing inform ational brochures about the centers. 
What is needed is an organized marketing cam paign targeting those who 
are involved with small businesses and those groups w hich are most likely 
to produce Angels. Given the current operating budgets of the centers, their 
ability to develop and im plem ent aggressive marketing programs are very 
limited. Funds are sim ply not available for such an effort. T he VCNs need 
Angels!
The importance of effective marketing for these centers is supported by 
Gaston’s finding that “the majority of responding investors (53.9 percent) 
wanted to invest more than the volum e of opportunities permitted” [16]. On 
average these investors wanted to invest 34.7 percent more than they were 
able to find suitable investments to support. T he total am ount of uninvested 
capital from this group is estimated at $19.3 b illion  [16]. T he obvious reason 
these funds are not being used to create jobs is because of a lack of sufficient 
information flow ing between investors and firms seeking capital. Well- 
marketed VCNs could be a solution to this problem.
Table 10 shows the sources from which these centers are funded. Seven 
of the ten which responded to our questionnaire must depend on state or 
federal funds for the bulk of their budgets. T his generally means that they 
are not being funded as separate entities but are included in  the funding for 
some other agency such as a Small Business Developm ent Center. Being 
housed and operated w ithin these other organizations may be a hinderance
to the development of the VCN. It appears from our research that those VCNs 
which are more or less separate entities have a better chance of higher 
participation levels. However, our data is too lim ited in this area to make 
a definite statement at this time.
T he success of the Venture Capital Networks has been limited. This 
should be anticipated since they have been in operation for such a short time 
and they have had very lim ited amounts budgeted for their operations. In 
almost every case, money was not available to fund any kind of marketing 
program. T he lim ited am ount of money available for marketing is used to 
produce brochures detailing characteristics of the center. There is little or 
no money available for any additional marketing effort. Word-of-mouth is 
the only marketing or advertising avenue for most centers.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is apparent from the data presented that much more needs to be done in 
this area of the Venture Capital Market. The lim ited success of the centers 
reflects a lack of adequate funding, and the short time they have been in  
operation. If the potential users, both entrepreneurs and investors, are to be 
reached by these centers there needs to be a greater marketing effort. However 
this cannot occur if budgets remain so limited. T he literature on small firm 
financing indicates that a strong need exists for the type of funding these 
Venture Capital Centers promote.
Recent articles in  the financial journals indicates that traditional venture 
capital providers are becom ing less interested in this group. Even those firms 
that need am ounts in  the $500,000-$600,000 range may find few, if any, 
venture capital companies that are interested. Research indicates that much 
of the vitality and competitiveness in  our economy must come from the 
development of small firms in the technology areas. If small firms can acquire 
adequate equity funding they are much more likely to make a significant 
contribution to job creation in our economy. Studies indicate that firms with 
fewer than 100 employees account for the majority of job creations.
T he concept of the Venture Capital Networks appears to hold high  
promise in  helping to fu lfill this major need of small firms, but without 
more marketing effort they may be like the man who winks in the dark— 
only he knows what is happening. When adequate funding is available the 
results have been very promising. However, the performance as measured 
by participation of investors and entrepreneurs w ill not likely equal the 
promise unless the present level of funding for promotion and marketing 
is increased.
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